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Abstract
In [3], the authors proposed a highly efficient secure and privacy-preserving scheme for secure vehicular communi-
cations. The proposed scheme consists of four protocols: system setup, protocol for STP and STK distribution, protocol
for common string synchronization, and protocol for vehicular communications. Here we define the security models for the
protocol for STP and STK distribution, and the protocol for vehicular communications, respectively. We then prove that these
two protocols are secure in our models.
✦
1 SECURITY MODEL
1.1 Security Model for the Protocol for STP and STK Distribution
The security and privacy of the protocol for STP and STK distribution is defined in the game below. It is run
between a challenger CH and an adversary Att who has full control of the network communications. Att can be
of three types:
• Type 1 adversary aims to break the message confidentiality property of our protocol. In our protocol, since we
assume that the underlying symmetric encryption/decryption scheme is secure, a type 1 adversary refers to
an adversary who can violate the message confidentiality property of the underlying signcryption scheme.
• Type 2 adversary aims to break the message authentication and non-repudiation properties of our protocol.
• Type 3 aims to break the privacy property of our protocol. Similar to a type 1 adversary, a type 3 adversary
refers to an adversary who can violate the privacy property of the underlying signcryption scheme.
The game has the following stages:
Initialize: On input a security parameter ℓ, CH generates the system parameters pub and passes pub to Att.
Attack: According to the protocol for STP and STK distribution, at this stage, Att is allowed to obtain the
following information from CH .
• Q1: The signcrypted message in the Request phase.
• Q2: The de-signcrypted message in the Verify phase (in the case that an RSU is corrupted).
• Q3: The ciphertext sent to the vehicle and the corresponding plaintext in the Replay and Update phases,
respectively.
• Q4: For an identity-based system, usually we also allow Att to obtain the (long-term) private keys of the
vehicles and RSUs (except the target one(s)).
Response: This phase has three cases:
• If Att is of type 1, Att returns two messages (m0,m1) and an RSU’s identity. CH randomly chooses mb ∈
{m0,m1} and generates a signcrypted message C. We note that in our protocol, the vehicle’s long-term
pseudonym is included in the message. In m0 and m1, the vehicle’s long-term pseudonyms are the same.
Att may continually make the queries in the Attack stage. Att wins the game if he can distinguish whether C
corresponds to m0 or m1 without querying the private key of the RSU or the plaintext corresponding to C.
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2• If Att is of type 2, Att returns a signcrypted message C and an RSU’s identity IDR. Let m = (n, LTP, τ) be
the plaintext corresponding to C. Att wins the game if C can pass the Verify phase and Att has never queried
the private key corresponding to LTP or the signcrypted message corresponding to (m,LTP, IDR).
• If Att is of type 3, Att returns two messages m0 and m1 and an RSU’s identity. We note that in our protocol,
the vehicle’s long-term pseudonym is included in the message. Let the vehicles’ long-term pseudonyms in m0
and m1 be LTP0 and LTP1, respectively. The only difference between m0 and m1 is that the two vehicles’
long-term pseudonyms in m0 and m1 are different. CH randomly chooses mb ∈ {m0,m1} and generates a
signcrypted message C. Att may continually make the queries in the Attack stage. Att wins the game if he
can distinguish whether C corresponds to LTP0 or LTP1 without querying the private key of the RSU or the
plaintext corresponding to C.
Definition 1: The protocol for STP and STK satisfies message confidentiality if no type 1 adversary can win the
above game in polynomial time with non-negligible probability.
Definition 2: The protocol for STP and STK satisfies message authentication and non-repudiation if no type 2
adversary can win the above game in polynomial time with non-negligible probability.
Definition 3: The protocol for STP and STK satisfies privacy if no type 3 adversary can win the above game in
polynomial time with non-negligible probability.
We note that the definition of privacy in this paper is slightly weaker than the definition of ciphertext anonymity
(a stronger definition of privacy) in [1]. However, in our protocol, we do not need to consider the privacy of an
RSU. Hence, our definition of privacy is sufficient for our protocol. Further, it is easy to see that if the protocol for
STP and STK distribution achieves message confidentiality, then the protocol also achieves privacy.
1.2 Security Model for Protocol for Vehicular Communications
The security of our protocol is modeled via the following game between a challenger CH and an adversary Att.
Initialize: On input a security parameter ℓ, CH generates the system parameters pub and passes pub to Att.
Attack: According to the protocol for vehicular communications, at this stage, Att is allowed to obtain the
following information from CH .
• Q5: The short-term private key of a vehicle (corresponding to an identity-based system).
• Q6: The signatures generated by the vehicles in the Sign phase.
• Q7: The real identity corresponding to a vehicle’s short-term pseudonym in the Trace phase.
We note that we do not need to model the signature verification and aggregation procedures in the Verify, Store
and Re-aggregate phases, because Att can do these operations himself.
Response: In our protocol, since we assume that the underlying symmetric encryption/decryption scheme is
secure and the KGC is fully trusted, Att cannot violate the privacy of a vehicle. Hence, Att can break our protocol
if and only if he can output a forged aggregate signature. Assume Att outputs a set of n vehicles’ short-term
pseudonyms from the set L∗ID = {STP
∗
1
, ..., STP ∗n}, n messages from the set L
∗
m = {m
∗
1
, ...,m∗n}, and an aggregate
signature σ∗. We say that Att wins the game if and only if
1) σ∗ is a valid aggregate signature on messages {m∗
1
, ...,m∗n} under {STP
∗
1
, ..., STP ∗n}.
2) At least one of the identities, without loss of generality, say STP ∗1 ∈ L
∗
ID has not been submitted in the Q5
queries, and (m∗
1
, STP ∗
1
) has never been submitted in the Q6 queries.
The above model captures the individual authentication and non-repudiation properties of our protocol. As to
the vehicle privacy and traceability properties, they are achieved using short-term pseudonyms. This method is
widely used in VANET systems.
2 SECURITY PROOFS
The security of our protocols is related to the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) and the computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) problems.
Let G1, G2 be two additive cyclic groups and GT be a multiplicative cyclic group, all with the same prime order
q; P1, P2 be random elements in G1 and G2, respectively; ψ be a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1. A map
eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT is called bilinear if 1) eˆ(aP1, bP2) = eˆ(P1, P2)
ab for any a, b ∈ Z/qZ; 2) eˆ(P1, P2) 6= 1GT ; 3) There
exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P1, P2).
• BDHψ
2,2,1 problem [2]: Given (P1, P2, aP2, bP2, cP1), compute eˆ(P1, P2)
abc for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z/qZ.
• CDHψ
2,2,1 problem [2]: Given (P1, P2, aP2, bP2), compute abP1 for unknown a, b ∈ Z/qZ.
32.1 Security of the Protocol for STP and STK Distribution
Our results are all in the random oracle model. In each of the results below we assume that the adversary makes
qi queries to Hi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5}. Assume the numbers of Q1 and Q2 queries made by the adversary are denoted
by qs and qd, respectively.
Theorem 1. If a type 1 adversary wins the game defined in Section 1.1 with probability ǫ, then a CH running in
polynomial time solves the BDHψ
2,2,1 problem with probability at least
ǫ ·
1
q2q5
.
Proof. Let (P1, P2, aP2, bP2, cP1) be the instance of the BDH
ψ
2,2,1 problem that we wish to solve.
Initialize: On input a security parameter ℓ, CH chooses pub = (G1,G2,GT , eˆ, P1, P2, U1, U2, ψ,H1 ∼ H6, Ek(·)/Dk(·),
l1, l2, l3, IDkgc, Pkgc) as the system public parameters, where U2 = bP2, U1 = ψ(U2). We describe how CH uses Att
to compute eˆ(P1, P2)
abc.
Attack: CH answers Att’s query as follows:
H1(LTPi) queries:
Choose xi at random from Z/qZ and ki from the key space of Ek(·)/Dk(·); compute PVi = xiP1; compute LTKi =
xU1; store (LTPi, PVi , LTKi, xi, ki) in L1 and respond with PVi .
H2(IDRi) queries:
At the beginning of the simulation, choose I uniformly at random from {1, ..., q2}. We show how to respond to the
i-th query made by Att below. Note that we assume Att does not make repeated queries.
• If i = I then respond with aP2.
• Else choose x′i uniformly at random from Z/qZ; compute PRi = x
′
iP2; compute Bi = x
′
iU2; store (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) in
L2 and respond with PRi .
H3(Yi||mi) queries:
• If (Yi,mi, hi) ∈ L3 for some hi, return hi.
• Else choose hi uniformly at random from Z/qZ; add (Yi,mi, hi) to L3 and return hi.
H5(ωi) queries:
• If (ωi, h
′
i) ∈ L5 for some h
′
i, return h
′
i.
• Else choose h′i uniformly at random from {0, 1}
l2 ; add (ωi, h
′
i) to L5 and return h
′
i.
Q4 queries:
The input of this query is a pseudonym/identity of a vehicle/RSU. We will assume that Att makes the query
H1(LTPi)/H2(IDRi) before he makes the Q4 query corresponding to LTPi/IDRi .
• If the input is equal to IDRI , abort the simulation.
• If the input is LTPi, search L1 for the entry (LTPi, PVi , LTKi, xi, ki) and return LTKi.
• Else search L2 for the entry (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) corresponding to IDRi and return Bi.
Q1 queries:
The input of this query is (mi, IDRi), where LTPi is included in mi. We will assume Att makes the queries
H1(LTPi) and H2(IDRi) before he makes this query.
• Find the entry (LTPi, PVi , LTKi, xi, ki) in L1.
• Choose ri uniformly at random from Z
∗
q and compute Yi = riPVi .
• Compute hi = H3(Yi||mi) (where H3 is the simulator above).
• Compute Zi = (ri + hi)LTKi.
• Compute PRi = H2(IDRi) (where H2 is the simulator above).
• Compute ωi = eˆ(riLTKi, PRi).
• Compute yi = H5(ωi)⊕ (Zi||mi) (where H5 is the simulator above).
• Return a signcrypted message (Yi, yi).
Q2 queries:
The input of this query is a signcrypted message (Yi, yi) and an identity of an RSU IDRi . We assume that Att
makes the query H2(IDRi) before making a Q2 query. We have the following cases.
Case 1: IDRi 6= IDRI
• Find the entry (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) in L2.
• Compute ωi = eˆ(Yi, Bi).
4• If ωi 6∈ L5, return ⊥; else compute Zi||mi = yi ⊕H5(ωi).
• Let the pseudonym in mi be LTPi. If LTPI 6∈ L1, return ⊥. Else compute PVi = H1(LTPi).
• If (Yi,mi) /∈ L3, return ⊥. Else compute hi = H3(Yi||mi).
• If eˆ(Zi, P2) 6= eˆ(Yi + hiPVi , U2), return ⊥. Else return mi, (Yi, Zi).
Case 2: IDRi = IDRI
• Step through the list L5 with entries (wi, h
′
i) as follows.
– Compute Zi||mi = yi ⊕ h
′
i.
– Let the pseudonym in mi be LTPi. If LTPi ∈ L1, let PVi = H1(LTPi) and find LTKi in L1, else move to
the next element in L5 and begin again.
– If (Yi,mi) ∈ L3, let hi = H3(Yi||mi), else move to the next element in L5.
– Check that ωi = eˆ(Zi − hiLTKi, aP2) and if not, move on to the next element in L2 and begin again.
– Check that eˆ(Zi, P2) = eˆ(Yi + hiPVi , U2), if so return mi, (Yi, Zi), else move on to the next element in L5.
• If no message has been returned after stepping through L5, return ⊥.
Q3 queries:
Find the corresponding symmetric key ki in L1. Output the corresponding ciphertext or plaintext using ki.
Response: Att outputs two identities LTP ∗, ID∗R and two messagesm0,m1. If ID
∗
R 6= IDRI , CH aborts. Otherwise
it chooses y∗ ∈ {0, 1}l2 and sets Y ∗ = cP1. It returns the signcrypted message σ
∗ = (Y ∗, y∗) to Att. Att may
continually make the queries in the Attack stage with the restriction defined in the model. These queries are
answered in the same way as those made by Att in the above stage. At the end of this phase, Att outputs a bit b.
CH searches L1 for the entry (LTP
∗, P ∗V , LTK
∗, x∗, k∗), she chooses some ω∗ at random from L5 and returns
ω∗x
∗−1
as her guess at the solution to the BDHψ
2,2,1 problem.
In the above simulation, if CH does not abort, then Att’s view is identical to the real-world attack. Similar to
the security proof of Theorem 2 in [1], we have that CH does not abort with probability at least
1
q2
.
Since ω∗ is randomly chosen from L5, we have that the possibility for CH to solve the BDH
ψ
2,2,1 problem is at least
ǫ ·
1
q2q5
.
Theorem 2. If a type 2 adversary wins the game defined in Section 1.1 with probability ǫ, then a CH running in
polynomial time solves the CDHψ
2,2,1 problem with probability at least
ǫ2(1 −
qs(q3 + qs)
q
)2 ·
1
4q2
1
(q3 + qs)2
.
Proof. Let (P1, P2, aP2, bP2) be the instance of the CDH
ψ
2,2,1 problem that we wish to solve.
Initialize: On input a security parameter ℓ, CH chooses pub = (G1,G2,GT , eˆ, P1, P2, U1, U2, ψ,H1 ∼ H6, Ek(·)/Dk(·),
l1, l2, l3, IDkgc, Pkgc) as the system public parameters, where U2 = bP2, U1 = ψ(U2). We describe how CH uses Att
to compute abP1.
Attack: CH answers Att’s query as follows:
H1(LTPi) queries:
At the beginning of the simulation, choose I uniformly at random from {1, ..., q1}. Note that we assume Att does
not make repeated queries.
• If i = I then respond with H1(LTPi) = ψ(aP2); choose ki from the key space of Ek(·)/Dk(·); store (LTPi, PVi ,⊥,
⊥, ki) in L1.
• Else choose xi uniformly at random from Z/qZ and ki from the key space of Ek(·)/Dk(·); compute PVi = xiP1;
compute LTKi = xiU1; store (LTPi, PVi , LTKi, xi, ki) in L1 and respond with PVi .
H2(IDRi) queries:
Choose x′i uniformly at random from Z/qZ; compute PRi = x
′
iP2; compute Bi = x
′
iU2; store (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) in
L2 and respond with PRi .
H3(Yi||mi) queries:
5• If (Yi,mi, hi) ∈ L3 for some hi, return hi.
• Else choose hi uniformly at random from Z
∗
q ; add (Yi,mi, hi) to L3 and return hi.
H5(ωi) queries:
• If (ωi, h
′
i) ∈ L5 for some h
′
i, return h
′
i.
• Else choose h′i uniformly at random from {0, 1}
l2 ; add (ωi, h
′
i) to L5 and return h
′
i.
Q4 queries:
The input of this query is a pseudonym/identity of a vehicle/RSU. We will assume that Att makes the query
H1(LTPi)/H2(IDRi) before he makes the Q4 query corresponding to LTPi/IDRi .
• If the input is equal to LTPI , abort the simulation.
• Else if the input is LTPi, search L1 for the entry (LTPi, PVi , LTKi, xi, ki) and return LTKi.
• Else search L2 for the entry (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) corresponding to IDRi and return Bi.
Q1 queries:
The input of this query is (mi, IDRi), where LTPi is included in mi. We will assume that Att makes the queries
H1(LTPi) and H2(IDRi) before he makes this query. Two cases arise:
Case 1: LTPi 6= LTPI
Use the simulator of Q1 in the proof of Theorem 1.
Case 2: LTPi = LTPI
• Choose ri, hi uniformly at random from Z
∗
q .
• Compute Yi = riP1 − hiH1(LTPi) and Zi = riU1.
• Add (Yi,mi, hi) to L3.
• Find the entry (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) in L2.
• Compute ωi = eˆ(Yi, Bi).
• Compute yi = H5(ωi)⊕ (Zi||mi) (where H5 is the simulator above).
• Return (Yi, yi).
Q2 queries:
• Find the entry (IDRi , PRi , Bi, x
′
i) in L2.
• Compute ωi = eˆ(Yi, Bi).
• If ωi 6∈ L5, return ⊥; else find yi corresponding to ωi and compute Zi||mi = yi ⊕H5(ωi).
• Let the pseudonym in mi be LTPi. If LTPI 6∈ L1, return ⊥. Else compute PVi = H1(LTPi).
• If (Yi,mi) 6∈ L3, return ⊥. Else compute hi = H3(Yi||mi).
• If eˆ(Zi, P2) 6= eˆ(Yi + hiPVi , U2), return ⊥. Else return mi, (Yi, Zi).
Q3 queries:
Find the corresponding symmetric key ki in L1. Output the corresponding ciphertext or plaintext using ki.
In the above simulation, if CH does not abort, then Att’s view is identical to the real-world attack. Similar to
the security proof of Theorem 3 in [1], we have CH does not abort with probability at least
(1−
qs(q3 + qs)
q
) ·
1
q1
.
With probability
ǫ(1−
qs(q3 + qs)
q
) ·
1
q1
Att outputs a forgery m∗, (Y ∗, Z∗), where the pseudonym in m∗ is LTPI .
Response: According to the Splitting Lemma, CH replays Att with the same random tape but different choice
of the response of H3. With probability
ǫ2(1−
qs(q3 + qs)
q
)2 ·
1
4q2
1
(q3 + qs)2
the two runs yield two forgeries m∗, (Y ∗, Z∗) and m∗, (Y ∗, Zˆ∗) with Z∗ 6= Zˆ∗ and h∗ 6= hˆ∗, where h∗ and hˆ∗
are the outputs of H3 corresponding to (Y
∗,m∗) in the first and second runs of the simulation respectively. Let
PV ∗ = H1(LTPI). Since the two forgeries should be valid, we have
eˆ(Z∗, P2) = eˆ(Y
∗ + h∗PV ∗ , U2)
6and
eˆ(Zˆ∗, P2) = eˆ(Y
∗ + hˆ∗PV ∗ , U2).
Since PV ∗ = aP1, we have
abP1 = (h
∗ − hˆ∗)−1(Z∗ − Zˆ∗).
Theorem 3. If a type 3 adversary wins the game defined in Section 1.1 with probability ǫ, then a CH running in
polynomial time solves the BDHψ
2,2,1 problem with probability at least
ǫ ·
1
q2q5
.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of the Theorem 1.
2.2 Security of the Protocol for Vehicular Communications
In each of the results below we assume that the adversary makes qHi queries to Hi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We assume Att
can ask at most qK times Q5 queries, and qS times Q6 queries.
Theorem 4. If there exists an adversary Att who has an advantage ε to break our protocol, then the CDHψ
2,2,1
problem can be solved in polynomial time with probability at least
ε′ ≥ (1−
1
qH1
)qK (1 −
1
qH1
1
qH2
(1 −
1
qH′
3
))qS
1
qH1
1
qH2
(1 −
1
qH′
3
)ε.
Proof. Let (P1, P2, aP2, bP2) be the instance of the CDH
ψ
2,2,1 problem that we wish to solve.
Initialize: On input a security parameter ℓ, CH chooses pub = (G1,G2,GT , eˆ, P1, P2, U1, U2, ψ,H1 ∼ H6, Ek(·)/Dk(·),
l1, l2, l3, IDkgc, Pkgc) as the system public parameters and λ from the key space of Ek(·)/Dk(·), where U2 = bP2, U1 =
ψ(U2). We describe how CH uses Att to compute abP1.
Attack: CH answers Att’s query as follows:
H1(STPi, j) queries:
Let H1 be the list of previous answers to these queries. CH picks I ∈ [1, qH1 ] uniformly at random. Whenever CH
receives an H1 query on (STPi, j) for j ∈ {0, 1}, CH does the following:
1) If there is a tuple (STPk, αk,0, α
′
k,0, αk,1, α
′
k,1, Pk,0, Pk,1) on the list H1 such that STPi = STPk, return Pk,j as
the answer.
2) Else if i = I , randomly choose αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1 ∈ Z/qZ, set Pi,0 = αi,0P1 +α
′
i,0U1, Pi,1 = αi,1P1 +α
′
i,1U1, add
(STPi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, Pi,0, Pi,1) to H1 and return Pi,j as the answer.
3) Else set α′i,0 = 0, α
′
i,1 = 0, randomly choose αi,0, αi,1 ∈ Z/qZ, set Pi,0 = αi,0P1, Pi,1 = αi,1P1, add (STPi, αi,0, α
′
i,0,
αi,1, α
′
i,1, Pi,0, Pi,1) to H1 and return Pi,j as the answer.
H2(CSi) queries:
Let H2 be the list of previous answers to these queries. CH picks J ∈ [1, qH2 ] uniformly at random. Whenever
Att issues a query H2(CSi), the same answer from the list H2 will be given if the request has been asked before.
Otherwise, CH selects a random βi ∈ Z/qZ; if i = J , computes PˆCSi = βiP2, else sets PˆCSi = βiaP2. Finally, CH
adds (CSi, PˆCSi , βi) to H2 and returns PˆCSi as the answer.
H3(mi, STPi, CSi) queries:
Let H3 be the list of previous answers to these queries. Whenever Att issues a query (mi, STPi, CSi) to H3, the
same answer from the list H3 will be given if the request has been asked before. Otherwise, CH first submits
(STPi, 0) to H1, then finds the tuple (STPi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, Pi,0, Pi,1) on H1, and finally does the following:
1) If STPi = STPI and CSi = CSJ (we assume that Att can ask at most qH′
3
< qH3 times such kind of queries),
randomly choose K ∈ [1, qH′
3
].
a) If it is the K-th query, set ci = −α
′
i,0/α
′
i,1, add (mi, STPi, CSi, ci) to H3 and return ci.
b) Else select a random ci ∈ Z/qZ, add (mi, STPi, CSi, ci) to H3 and return ci as the answer.
2) Else, select a random ci ∈ Z/qZ, add (mi, STPi, CSi, ci) to H3 and return ci as the answer.
Q5 queries: When Att issues a private key query corresponding to STPi, the same answer will be given if the
request has been asked before. Otherwise, CH looks for a tuple (STPi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, Pi,0, Pi,1) on H1; if none
is found, CH makes an H1 query on (IDi, j) (j = 0 or 1) to generate such a tuple, and finally does as follows
1) If IDi = IDI , abort.
2) Else return (Di,0, Di,1) as the answer, where Di,0 = αi,0U1, Di,1 = αi,1U1.
7Q6 queries: The input of this query is (CSi,mi, STPi); CH first makes H1(IDi, 0), H2(CSi) and H3(mi, STPi, CSi)
queries if they have not been made before, then recovers (STPi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, Pi,0, Pi,1) fromH1, (CSi, PˆCSi , βi)
from H2, (mi, STPi, CSi, ci) from H3 and generates the signature as follows
1) If STPi = STPI , CSi = CSJ , and ci = −α
′
i,0/α
′
i,1, choose Si,2 ∈ G
∗
1
, compute Si,1 = βiSi,2 + αi,0U1 + αi,1ciU1,
output Mi = (mi||STPi||(Si,1, Si,2)).
2) Else if STPi = STPI , CSi = CSJ , abort.
3) Else if STPi = STPI , choose ri ∈ Z/qZ, set Si,2 = riP1 − β
−1
i (Pi,0 + ciPi,1), compute Si,1 = riψ(PˆCS1), output
Mi = (mi||STPi||(Si,1, Si,2)).
4) Else, randomly choose ri ∈ Z/qZ, compute Si,2 = riP1, set Si,1 = riψ(PˆCSi) + αi,0U1 + ciαi,1U1, output
Mi = (mi||STPi||(Si,1, Si,2)).
Note that in the protocol, CSi is only for one-time use. Hence, it is reasonable for CH to abort when STPi =
STPI , CSi = CSJ and ci 6= −α
′
i,0/α
′
i,1.
Q7 queries: CH outputs the real identity of a vehicle based on the Trace phase using λ.
Response: Eventually, Att returns L∗ID = {STP
∗
1 , ..., STP
∗
n}; n messages from the set L
∗
M = {m
∗
1, ...,m
∗
n}; a common
string CS∗ and a forged aggregate signature σ∗ = (S∗
1
, S∗
2
).
CH recovers (STP ∗i , α
∗
i,0, α
′
i,0
∗
, α∗i,1, α
′
i,1
∗
, P ∗i,0, P
∗
i,1) from H1, (CS
∗, PˆCS∗ , β
∗) from H2, (m
∗
i , STP
∗
i , CS
∗, c∗i ) from
H3 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
CH requires that CS∗ = CSJ and there exists i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that STP
∗
i = STPI , c
∗
i 6= −α
′∗
i,0/α
′∗
i,1 and Att has
not made a Q6 query on (CS
∗,m∗i , STP
∗
i ). Without loss of generality, we let i = 1. In addition, the forged aggregate
signature must satisfy
eˆ(S∗
1
, P2) = eˆ(S
∗
2
, PˆCS∗)eˆ(
n∑
i=1
P ∗i,0 +
n∑
i=1
c∗iP
∗
i,1, U2).
Otherwise, CH aborts.
If CH does not abort, by our setting, P ∗
1,0 = α
∗
1,0P1 + α
′∗
1,0U1, P
∗
1,1 = α
∗
1,1P1 + α
′∗
1,1U1, PˆCS∗ = β
∗P2; and for
i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, P ∗i,j = α
∗
i,jP1, where j ∈ {0, 1}; hence, CH can compute
abP1 = (α
′∗
1,0 + c
∗
1
α′∗
1,1)
−1(S∗
1
−
n∑
i=2
α∗i,0U1 −
n∑
i=2
α∗i,1c
∗
iU1 − β
∗S∗
2
− (α∗
1,0 + c
∗
1
α∗
1,1)U1).
To complete the proof, we shall show that CH solves the given instance of the CDHψ
2,2,1 problem with probability
at least ε′. First, we analyze the four events needed for CH to succeed:
• Σ 1: CH does not abort in the above simulation.
• Σ 2: Att generates a valid and nontrivial aggregate signature forgery.
• Σ 3: Event Σ 2 occurs, CS∗ = CSJ and there exists i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that STP
∗
i = STPI , c
∗
i 6= −α
′∗
i,0/α
′∗
i,1 (as
mentioned previously, we assume i = 1).
CH succeeds if all of these events happen. The probability Pr[Σ 1 ∧ Σ 2 ∧Σ 3] can be decomposed as
Pr[Σ 1 ∧ Σ 2 ∧ Σ 3]
= Pr[Σ 1] Pr[Σ 2|Σ 1] Pr[Σ 3|Σ 1 ∧Σ 2].
It is easy to see that the above probability for CH to solve the CDHψ
2,2,1 problem is
ε′ = Pr[Σ 1 ∧ Σ 2 ∧ Σ 3]
≥ (1−
1
qH1
)qK (1 −
1
qH1
1
qH2
(1 −
1
qH′
3
))qS
1
qH1
1
qH2
(1 −
1
qH′
3
)ε.
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